A 1970 paper about used cars explains why accountability apps are hard to choose

George Akerlof's 'lemons' paper, rejected by three journals before it ran, describes a market where buyers cannot judge quality. Accountability apps sit in one, and four questions can still separate the checkable claims from the unfalsifiable ones.

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In his 2001 essay “Writing ‘The Market for Lemons’”, George Akerlof recalls the paper’s reception. The American Economic Review turned it down as too trivial for its pages, and the Review of Economic Studies followed. Referees at the Journal of Political Economy argued it was wrong, and one reported line from that exchange is that if it were right, economics would be different. It ran in the Quarterly Journal of Economics in 1970, and Akerlof shared the 2001 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences with Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz.

The argument fits in one sentence. When sellers know the quality of a product and buyers cannot check it, buyers pay for average quality, sellers of above-average goods drop out, and the average falls. Accountability apps, which promise that someone or something will make you do the thing, are a clean case of it.

Why can’t a buyer tell one accountability app from another?

A buyer judges an accountability app by its screenshots, its reviews and its promise. None of those measure the only outcome that matters, which is whether the buyer’s behavior changes in month three. That outcome arrives after the money is spent, and it is tangled up with the buyer’s own motivation, so even a satisfied customer cannot say how much the app contributed.

Here is a toy version, with invented numbers. Suppose half the apps in a store verify that you did the thing (they check a clip, a location or a witness’s reply) and half just let you tap “done”. Buyers value a verifying app at $10 a month and a tap-to-confirm app at $2. They cannot tell which is which, so they will pay about $6. Now suppose verification costs the maker $7 a month to run, in review, storage and support. At $6 the verifying makers lose money and some leave or quietly water down the check. Buyers learn the average is worse, so they offer $4, then $3. The tap-to-confirm apps, which cost almost nothing, stay. That is the lemons spiral, and nobody in it has to be acting in bad faith.

The numbers are made up, but the shape is the point: the buyer’s uncertainty is a tax paid by the careful, expensive product.

What escapes the spiral?

Akerlof’s own list of remedies was institutional: guarantees, brand names, licensing. Michael Spence’s later work added the buyer-side logic of signaling, where a seller proves quality by doing something that would cost a low-quality seller too much. A diploma works as a signal if it is harder to get for people who would be poor employees. The costly-signaling post on peacock tails covers the biology version of the same idea.

Applied to apps, a signal of quality has to fail three tests that a screenshot passes easily.

  1. Does it cost a faker more than a sincere user? A tap costs everyone the same one second. A recording of yourself upright, in your actual kitchen, costs a person who is still in bed a lot more.
  2. Does someone with no stake in your self-image look at it? A streak counter is read only by you. A friend reading your clip is not neutral, but at least a second person’s judgment can be wrong in a different way than yours.
  3. Does it leave an artifact that can be wrong? A claim like “keeps you accountable” cannot be falsified. A saved clip with a timestamp can be checked by anyone, which is what makes it a poor thing for a faker to produce at scale. Where that checking breaks, the fakeability matrix lists the cheap workarounds.

A fourth question is about the maker rather than the product. What happens to the maker if the check fails? An app that is paid per subscriber and never loses revenue when a user cheats has no reason to tighten the check. An app whose product is the check has one.

A used-car inspection for accountability apps

The inspection is four questions, each answerable in ten minutes without paying.

  • What exactly is submitted at the moment you would most like to skip? Name the object (a clip, a tap, a text).
  • Who sees it, and could that person tell if it were staged?
  • What happens when you submit nothing?
  • Can you describe a way to cheat in one sentence? If you can, estimate what it costs you compared with doing the real thing.

If the cheating answer is “tap the button from bed”, the app is selling the same thing for free that a note on the fridge sells. That is not a moral judgment. For some people, a low-friction tracker is the right tool, since they need the record and not the pressure. What the inspection prevents is paying for pressure and receiving a record. For why self-report is weak evidence even when the user is sincere, the argument for video over self-report has the details.

Where DontSnooze lands on the four questions

DontSnooze submits a recorded clip to friends the user picked, which answers the first two questions better than a tap does. Its weak point is the one the framework predicts: a friend who likes you is a lenient grader, so a doctored clip may sail through, and it is worth testing that against your own friends before paying for anything.

One limit of the lemons analogy itself: Akerlof’s model assumes one price for everything the buyer cannot tell apart. Real app stores have free tiers, refunds and reviews, which are the guarantees and brand names his paper predicted would appear. The spiral is probably weaker than in the toy numbers. I have not seen data on how well app-store ratings track whether users changed their behavior, so how far those guarantees close the gap is unknown.

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